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We examine the impact of capital account policies on FDI inflows. Using an annual panel dataset of 83 
developing and developed countries for 1984-2000, we find that capital account openness is positively but 
only very moderately associated with the amount of FDI inflows after controlling for other macroeconomic 
and institutional measures. To a large extent, other country characteristics seem to determine FDI inflows 
instead of capital account policies. Furthermore, we find that capital controls are easily circumvented in 
corrupt and politically unstable regimes. We conclude that liberalizing the capital account is not sufficient 
to generate increases in inflows unless it is accompanied by a lower level of corruption or a decrease in 
political risk.  
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During the past thirty years, foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown in 
importance with a large number of developing countries able to attract inward FDI in 
increasing volumes. The theoretical literature that examines FDI identifies a number of 
channels through which FDI inflows will be beneficial to the receiving economy.
1 Yet, 
the empirical literature has lagged behind and has had more trouble identifying these 
advantages in practice. Most prominently, a large number of applied papers have looked 
at the FDI-growth nexus.
2
The consensus that is slowly emerging is that FDI is beneficial when compared to 
other types of capital inflows such as portfolio investment or syndicated bank loans, 
though some maintain that even this beneficial effect is limited.
3 Additional research 
efforts are devoted to identifying other features unique to FDI, such as its relative 
permanence or the positive externalities it generates.
4 Notwithstanding these fragile 
conclusions, most countries continue to vigorously pursue policies aimed to encourage 
more FDI inflows; these include very significant tax breaks and other types of subsidies 
granted to multinationals in return for setting up domestic operations.
5 The multilateral 
                                                 
1 For a recent theoretical contribution, with a discussion of its empirical applicability, see Chakrabarti, 
2003. 
2 While most papers identify FDI as a source of technological diffusion, productivity increases, and growth 
accelerations, the real significance of these effects is still in debate with a minority of papers disagreeing 
with all these positive conclusions.  A prominent contribution, Borensztein et al. (1998), argues that FDI 
will lead to increased GDP growth only beyond a threshold level of accumulated human capital stock. With 
the availability of better data, the last few years have seen an especially large number of empirical papers 
devoted to this question (e.g., Alfaro et al., 2004; Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Durham, 2004; Hsiao 
and Shen, 2003; and Li and Liu, 2005, Vu et al., 2007). 
3 Gray (2004) even goes so far as to suggest that countries should restrict FDI inflows, but his position is 
clearly in the minority among academic economists writing in English. 
4 For widely-cited examples, see Aitken and Harrison (1999), Fernández-Arias and Hausmann (2001), and 
Sarno and Taylor (1999).  
5 For a critical look at these domestic tax/subsidy policies, see Hanson (2001). For a discussion of the 
empirical evidence on tax policy’s impact on FDI inflows see Hines (1996); and for a more recent survey, 
  3public organizations, in particular the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), have also been vocal supporters of FDI promotion policies. One 
of the more common policies the international institutions frequently prescribe within this 
context is liberalization of the capital account.
6  
Yet, very little empirical work has been done to examine the impact of capital 
account policies on FDI inflows. While neo-classical modeling suggests that capital 
account liberalization will increase FDI inflows, this might not be the case if the neo-
classical assumptions of perfect information, a complete menu of contingent contracts 
and competitive markets are relaxed. Developing countries - with their underdeveloped 
financial markets, lack of corporate transparency, insufficient national data-collection and 
dissemination, and susceptibility to large fluctuations in exchange rates - might be 
particularly vulnerable to perverse impacts of capital account liberalizations. In this 
paper, we aim to examine macroeconomic data to investigate the relationship between 
capital account policies and the inflows of foreign direct investment. 
Table 1 presents recent trends in FDI inflows both as a percentage of output and 
as a percentage of fixed capital formation. Apparent is the worldwide trend increase in 
the importance of FDI (using both measures) throughout the 1980s and 1990s in all 
geographical regions, with FDI inflows after 2000 increasing to 4-5 times the level 
experienced during the 1980s. Yet, in several regions, net FDI flow peaked in 1995-1999 
period and current levels are still below that peak. As is seen in figure 1 for emerging 
markets, more recent figures reveal that while 2001-2003 have indeed been years of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mooij and Ederveen (2003). Gastanaga et al. (1998) analyze other host-country policies that aim to 
encourage FDI inflows. 
6 For the IMF’s role in promoting capital account liberalization, see Joyce and Noy (2005). 
  4decline, FDI flows into this group have soared again in 2004 and are predicted to 
continue soaring through 2006. Their level today is appreciably higher than during the 
previous peak in 2001.
7 If those trends continue, then understanding the determinants of 
foreign direct investment flows will only become even more important. 
Section 2 provides a brief survey of the extensive empirical work on the 
determinants of FDI inflows and of the very few papers that have looked at the nexus of 
FDI and capital account policies highlighting our contribution.  Section 3 presents our 
empirical model and the data we use.  Section 4 analyzes the results and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Empirical Literature  
Recent contributions to the literature on the determinants of FDI inflows are 
summarized in table 2. This literature is quite large, with much of it focusing on an 
OECD dataset of out-bound bi-lateral dataset of FDI flows. A recent survey of this 
literature and the micro-empirical literature on the industrial-organizational foundations 
of FDI is provided in Blonigen (2005). Another strand in the literature on capital flows 
examines the impacts of capital account policies on other variables such as the volumes 
of short-term capital flows (the so-called ‘hot money’) or the volume and price of 
investment in the receiving country. Notable recent contributions in this strand include 
Henry (2003), Edwards and Rigobon (2005) on the Chilean case, Carvalho and Garcia 
(2006) on the Brazilian case, and a recent survey by Forbes (2006). 
In the following discussion, we focus only on those papers that have examined the 
capital account - FDI nexus which is also the focus of our work. Desai et al. (2004), using 
                                                 
7 Mody (2004) offers more analysis of FDI flows over time and across regional groupings. 
  5firm level data from the U.S., find that American multinationals manage to circumvent 
capital controls by adjusting their reported intra-firm trade, affiliate profits and dividend 
repatriations. On the other hand, they identify a number of ways in which capital controls 
make operations more costly to the foreign affiliate, and thereby reduce FDI inflows 
significantly. American affiliates are about 15% smaller in countries with capital controls 
and, importantly, this reduction disappears once countries open up their capital accounts. 
Montiel and Reinhart (1999) examine the impact of capital account policies and 
sterilized foreign exchange interventions on the volume and composition of capital flows 
using a policy index they developed for the years 1990-1996. They conclude that 
imposing capital controls had no impact on volumes of flows but did shift the 
composition of flows toward short term – ‘hot money’ – flows. Alfaro et al. (2005), and 
Aizenman and Noy (2003), also find that capital controls have no impact on aggregate 
capital flow volumes. Aizenman and Noy (2006), find that while capital controls have no 
impact on FDI gross flows, controls on the current account do have an indirect impact on 
FDI inflows through their impact on goods trade. 
The paper closest to ours is Asiedu and Lien (2004). In this paper, the authors use 
a cross-country macro panel of net FDI flows to examine the impact of external policies 
(controls on the capital account, exchange rate regime and a surrender of export proceeds 
requirement) on net FDI flows. They present mixed findings with some evidence that FDI 
flows are impacted by capital account policies but only in specific geographical regions. 
In light of these puzzling and often conflicting results and the prominence of 
policy debates on these issues, it is clear that more research into the capital flows / capital 
account policies nexus is desirable. Our paper is different from the previous literature 
  6described above in several ways. First, as our dependent variable we use net FDI inflows 
(FDI inflows minus repatriated investments) instead of the Asiedu and Lien (2004) 
measure of net FDI flows (net FDI inflows minus direct-investment-abroad/net-FDI-
outflows) or Aizenman and Noy’s (2006) measure of FDI gross flows. Secondly, we use 
a different measure of capital controls that was recently developed in Chinn and Ito 
(2006) rather than the dichotomous measure used in almost all of the previous literature.  
Thirdly, measures of capital controls are based on a de jure state, but it is likely 
that the de facto state of enforcement of these regulations is of considerable importance in 
identifying any empirically observable link. It is also probable that the de facto state is 
influenced by institutional characteristics of the receiving economy. Consequently, we 
examine the impact of institutional factors – corruption and political stability - on the 
degree of association between capital controls and the flows of FDI. Finally, as is 
described and reasoned in the following sections, our data coverage and empirical 
estimation methodology are different.  
 
3.    Methodology and Data 
3.1.   Data     
We collected a macroeconomic annual panel data for 62 developing and 21 
developed countries from 1984 to 2000.
8 Blonigen and Wang (2005) argue that pooling 
developed and developing countries is inappropriate in empirical FDI studies. Besides 
other differences, they find that the factors that affect FDI inflows are different across the 
                                                 
8 We use dummy variables to fill most of the missing observations but still have several missing 
observations, so we have an unbalanced panel. If there were more than 3 missing observations for one 
country for a single variable, we used a binary replacement variable to enable us to include the observations 
in the regressions. 
  7two groups. We therefore conduct all of our analyses separately for developed and 
developing countries.
9
Data for FDI is taken from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics database. 
The measure we use is for net FDI inflows (foreign direct investment inflows minus 
repatriated foreign investments). FDI is defined by the IMF as investment by foreigners 
that acquire a management interest (10% or more of voting stock). It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other long- and short-term capital.
10
An analysis of available data on capital controls is available in Edison et al. 
(2004). The most popular source for data is the IMF’s publication, Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAR). Most authors use a binary 
variable on the existence/absence of restrictions on the capital account taken from the 
AREAR data. As is argued in Edison et al. (2004) and Chinn and Ito (2006), this 
dichotomous measure is imperfect since there are a variety of ways and grades in which 
the capital account can be restricted. As a complete dataset on the full menu of capital 
restrictions makes cross-country empirical estimation impractical, we focus on a 
continuous index that includes other components of external policies for which data is 
available in the AREAR database. 
The indicator of capital account openness we employ was developed in Chinn and 
Ito (2006). They used the data reported in the AREAR on the existence of multiple 
exchange rates, restrictions on the current and capital accounts (where the latter is 
                                                 
9 Developed countries are defined based on the World Bank’s classification system. 
10 The net FDI flows variable that is conventionally employed (taken from the IMF’s Balance of Payments 
Statistics or the World Bank’s World Development Indicators) is the net FDI inflows we use minus net FDI 
outflows. That measure thus includes also outward FDI (investment by domestic resident firms in foreign 
countries and the repatriation of that investment). Outward FDI (net FDI outflows) is most likely 
determined by other factors so we do not include it. More details are available in: International Monetary 
Fund (2001). 
  8measured as the proportion of the last five years without controls) and requirements to 
surrender export proceeds in order to capture the intensity of controls on capital account 
transactions. Their index of openness is the first standardized principal component of the 
four variables above, and in practice ranges from -2.0 in the case of most control to 2.5 in 
the case of most liberalization.  We generate a new variable, KAOPN, to eliminate the 
negative sign: KAOPN = (CHINNITO+2)/4.5. This data is available for 108 developed 
and developing countries for 1970-2000. 
  The additional macroeconomic and institutional data used for control variables in 
the regressions is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the 
PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide, respectively. Details on the variables’ 
definitions and sources are available in the appendix. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
We start with a standard FDI determination model:  
it t t it it FDI D X α β =++ ε                    (1)       
with time fixed-effects ( ) and a comprehensive list of  independent variables ( t D it X ) 
obtained from the previous research that is detailed in table 2. We follow a downward 
piecewise algorithm in pairing down our specification in order to avoid omitted variables. 
We gradually eliminate variables with high multi-colinearity, using the Variance Inflation 
Factors test (VIF). The test uses the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix in a 
regression and is given by: 
21 (1 ) ii k VIF R
− =− , where 
2
ik R  is the
2 R  from regressing the Xi 
on k other variables.  When there is perfect multi-colinearity, 
2
ik R equals to one, and the 
  9VIF approaches infinity. Kennedy (2003) recommends that any variable with VIF greater 
than ten be eliminated. 
For the developing countries dataset, we obtain 18 variables with VIF < 10. The 
18 explanatory variables are:  corruption (CORR ⎯with the higher value denoting less 
corruption); financial risk rating (FIN⎯with higher value denoting less financial risk), 
political risk rating (POLI⎯with higher value denoting less political risk), exports 
(EXP), GDP growth rate (GDPG), GDP per capita (GDPPCL), GDP growth volatility 
(GDPGV), interest rate controls (INTR), lagged value of FDI net inflows (FDIL), gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF), inflation (INFL), economic stability (ECON), life 
expectancy (LIFE), literacy rate (LITER), government consumption (GCONS), ratio of 
deposit money bank assets to GDP (DMAGDP), private credit by deposit money banks 
and other institutions to GDP (PCDMO), and exchange rate volatility (EXCHAV).
11
We also add fixed effect (time and country effects) and the capital control 
variables of interest to obtain: 
it t t i i it it it FDI D D X KAOPN α γβδ =+ ++ + ε
                                                
            (2)       
Finally, in order to examine whether the impact of capital controls on FDI inflows 
is sensitive to different institutional and political-economic differences in the destination 
economies, we estimate equation (2) and also include KACOR (interaction between 
capital openness and corruption), KAFIN (capital openness and financial risk), and 
KAPOL (capital openness and political instability).   
 
 
11 In a previous version, we also included regressions with a more parsimonious specification that includes 
only 11 explanatory variables whose coefficients have a p>0.5 of being different from zero. Results, 
however, are insensitive to the elimination or inclusion of these variables. 
  10Results 
In table 3, we first describe and report on our benchmark specifications – these 
regressions include all of the control variables but do not include the capital account 
policy variables. We report separately specifications for developing (non-developed) and 
developed countries (fixed effects and OLS). We obtain the following general results: For 
the developing country sample, there is evidence of a negative impact of corruption on 
FDI inflows, and a negative effect of financial risk with the opposite effect for political 
risk.
12 These results disappear in a fixed effect specification since these variables do not 
change much over time. For this sample, we also observe a positive association between 
exports and FDI inflows, a negative impact of past GDP growth volatility and a positive 
impact of gross fixed capital formation. All these results correspond closely with much of 
the previous research described in table 2. For the developed countries sample, we 
observe a similar pattern for exports and GDP growth volatility. In addition, we see some 
counter-intuitive evidence of a positive impact of inflation, and a negative impact of GDP 
growth. The explanatory power (adjusted R
2) of these models is between 0.34 and 0.57. 
All the regression specifications results described hence (in tables 4-6) also contain all of 
the control variables described above (in table 3).  
 In table 4, we report the full specification of our empirical model including the 
capital account openness variable. In all instances (developing and developed countries 
and in the fixed and OLS specifications) the capital account openness measure is 
positively associated with the amount of FDI inflows after controlling for all other 
macroeconomic and institutional measures.  
                                                 
12 See Aizenman and Noy (2004) for a similar result and a theoretical model explaining it. 
  11For the OLS estimates, the coefficient for the developing countries sample is 
smaller. But, once we control for country-specific time-invariant effects (fixed effects), 
we find that the impact of capital account openness is much bigger for developing 
countries. Since in our sample period, changes in capital account policies were much 
more prevalent in the developing countries sample, the disappearance of the capital 
policies’ effect in the developed country panel is not surprising. For the developed 
country sample, any identified impact of capital openness is apparently due to country 
specific characteristics that we are unable to control for.  
As for the economic significance of this effect, we find that an increase of one 
standard deviation in the capital openness index will increase FDI inflows by 0.71% and 
0.32% (of the receiving country’s GDP) for the developing and developed countries 
samples, respectively.
13 While statistically significant, it appears that capital account 
liberalization increases FDI inflows only modestly. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 investigate the interaction between the institutional factors, as 
proxies for enforcement of the capital account regulations, and the regulations themselves 
in determining the amount of FDI inflows. In table 5, we note that the previously reported 
clear-cut positive association between capital account openness and FDI inflows no 
longer holds once we control for the interactions of institutions/enforcement. The most 
interesting result, in our view, is that capital openness seems to be effective in generating 
more FDI inflows only if the level of corruption is low. Apparently, either capital 
controls are more easily circumvented in corrupt environment or capital openness, in and 
of itself, is not enough to generate increases in inflows unless it is accompanied by 
                                                 
13 These calculations are based on the coefficients obtained in specifications 4.2 and 4.4, respectively. 
  12decrease in the level of corruption. We obtain similar results for political risk. Liberalized 
capital account is only efficient in generating more inflows in an environment of low 
political risk.  
Interestingly, these results for corruption and political risk hold for both OLS and 
fixed effects suggesting that the effect is of importance over time, as well. In table 6 we 
present similar results for the developed countries sample.  
 
In a first attempt to establish robustness, We provide, in appendix B, the results of 
the benchmark regressions using the conventional binary indicator for capital account 
openness that is based on the data from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. For all the control variables, results are very 
similar to the previously reported regressions. The coefficient for the binary indicator of 
capital account openness, on the other hand, is now occasionally negative and significant 
(in the OLS specification for developing countries and in the fixed effects specification 
for developed countries). This can suggest that capital account openness leads to 
decreases in the volumes of FDI inflows. More probable, in our view, is that this binary 
measure is too crude a measure of the capital account regime and that our result, where 
the degree of capital account openness does not matter unless one accounts for corruption 
and institutional stability is the more likely possibility.   
To further examine robustness we also utilize a different way to examine the 
differential impact of capital account openness on FDI inflows for high/low corruption or 
high/low politically stable regime. We divide the sample into low/high corruption 
observations with the median corruption level used as a threshold. We re-ran key 
  13specifications separately for each sub-sample (high/low level of corruption), and then 
compare the coefficients on the capital account variable. As can be expected in light of 
our previous results, capital account openness does lead to more FDI inflows in low 
corruption country-year observations but may lead to even less FDI inflows in high 
corruption states.
14  
Very similar conclusions also result from dividing the sample into low/high 
financial and political stability environments. For developing countries, a financially and 
politically stable environment allows the economy to reap the benefits of capital account 
openness with additional FDI inflows. This is never the case for financially and 
politically unstable regimes, in which openness does not result in any statistically 
observable increase in FDI inflows. All of these results are available upon request. 
 
Since we view these set of results as an interesting contribution to the literature, 
we verify their robustness using two other measures of political stability and a proxy for 
corruption. We use and index of political freedom (the measure sums up the political 
rights and civil liberties indices available from Freedom House) and an index that 
measures the durability of a political regime (based on past regime changes – this 
measure is the DURABLE index from the Polity IV dataset). We utilize a measure of the 
degree of democracy in a political regime as a proxy for corruption since a alternative 
direct measure of corruption with similar panel coverage is not available.
15 Results 
                                                 
14 This result holds for developing countries. For developed countries, we again see a more beneficial 
impact of openness in low corruption states but the difference and statistical significance are much lower. 
15 This measure aggregates annual measures for both institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy 
(AUTOC)….this procedure provides a single regime score that ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 
(full autocracy).” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000, p. 12). 
  14remain qualitatively identical and similarly significant with the coefficients slightly 
bigger for the Freedom House index and slightly smaller for the Polity IV measure. 
The measurement of capital controls is fraught with difficulty.
16 While the 
measure we have used is somewhat more nuanced than the oft-used binary measure 
obtained from IMF publications, we clearly need to establish the robustness of our results 
using alternative measures. In recent work, Edwards (2006) constructed an index of de 
jure capital mobility by combining information from Quinn (2003) and Mody and 
Murshid (2002) with information from country-specific sources. This new index has a 
scale from 0 to 100, where higher numbers denote a higher degree of de jure capital 
mobility.
17 The results obtained using the Edwards capital openness index are 
qualitatively very similar to the ones we obtained from the Chinn-Ito index and are 
presented in an appendix (tables C-E).
18
It might be the case that the magnitude of foreign direct investment inflows 
dictate or change the incentives of governments in adopting capital account policy – a 
problem of endogeneity. We carry out endogeneity tests for developing and developed 
countries.  First, capital openness is regressed against all other variables, and residual of 
this regression is saved.  In the second step, we regress the structural equation on capital 
openness and all other variables with the residual of the first regression added.  If there is 
an endogeneity problem, this residual will be significantly different from zero.
19 The p-
value of the estimated coefficient for this residual is 0.852 for developing countries and 
0.470 for developed countries.  Based upon these results, we fail to reject the null 
                                                 
16 See Edison et. al. (2004). 
17 For details on this index, see Edwards (2006). The data is available for 1970-2004 for 163 countries (with 
many missing observations). 
18 The statistical significance of the results is somewhat weaker. 
19 This is a modified Hausman test described in Kennedy (2003), 172-173. 
  15hypothesis that this residual is not significantly different from zero and, hence, we 
conclude that there is no evidence of endogeneity, and 2SLS estimation is not needed. 
In order to ensure that endogeneity is indeed not biasing our results, we also run 
the main specifications using an estimation methodology that accounts for a possible 
endogeneity in the RHS variables. We implement the commonly used Arellano and Bond 
(1991) GMM dynamic two-step panel estimator. In tables 7 and 8, where these results are 
reported, we also report the statistics for autocorrelation and the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions (these are derived in Arellano and Bond, 1991). The results we 
obtain are qualitatively and quantitatively almost identical to those we obtained using the 
fixed effect least squares estimator while, as can be expected, the increased efficiency of 
the GMM algorithm leads to much higher t-statistics. This confirms our previous finding 
that endogeneity does not appear to bias our result. 
We also carry out a Granger-causality test. Capital openness is regressed against 
three lagged values of FDI and its own three lags in addition to the other control 
variables. The p-value of the F test for joint significance of the three FDI lags is 0.428 for 
developing countries and 0.368 for developed countries. We thus fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of these lags are not significantly different from zero.  We 
conclude that FDI does not appear to Granger-cause capital openness, and simultaneous 
equation estimations are not needed. 
 
5.   Conclusion and Caveats 
Our basic finding from the benchmark model is clear and intuitive; the capital 
account openness measure is positively but moderately associated with the amount of 
  16FDI inflows after controlling for other macroeconomic and institutional measures. Yet, 
the clear-cut positive association between capital account openness and FDI inflows no 
longer holds once we control for the interactions with institutional quality and 
enforcement. Capital controls are easily circumvented in corrupt and politically unstable 
environments; and capital account liberalization will generate increases in FDI inflows 
only in environments with a lower level of corruption and political risk.  
Furthermore, our measure of capital controls examines the rules that govern 
capital flows that are ‘on the books’ (a de jure measure). It is plausible that the degree of 
enforcement of these regulations differs across countries and across time. We expect 
enforcement of these regulations to interact with the de jure measure in its impact on 
actual flows; though de jure rules might also have a separate impact since there is a 
degree of uncertainty with regard to future enforcement policy. While we tried to control 
for enforcement using institutional proxies, their correlation with actual enforcement is 
unclear.  
We believe more detail on the intensity of rules may provide a more nuanced 
picture of the impact of regulations on de facto FDI inflows than one is able to discern 
using the cruder measures of capital controls that are generally used. Specific case studies 
that report with more detail on the impacts of the exact regulations in place might shed 
more light on these questions. Clearly, the main drawback of this approach is a difficulty 
to discern the general applicability of specific case studies without a large volume of such 
studies.
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  20Appendix A. Data Definitions and Sources 
Code Definition  of  Variable  Source 
FDI 
inflows 
net inflows of investment that acquires a 
management interest (10% or more of voting 
stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy 
other than that of the investor. 
IMF - BOPS
 a
KAOPN1  Capital controls index  Chinn and Ito (2005) 
KAOPN2  Capital controls index  Edwards (2006) 
CORR  Corruption  PRS - ICRG
 b
FIN  financial risk rating  PRS - ICRG 
POLI  political risk rating  PRS - ICRG 
EXP  Exports  WB – WDI 
c
GDPG  GDP growth  WB - WDI 
GDPPCL  GDP per capita  WB - WDI 
GDPGV  GDP growth volatility  Authors calculations 
INTR  interest rate controls  Abiad and Mody (2005) 
GFCF  gross fixed capital formation  WB - WDI 
INFL  Inflation  WB - WDI 
a The IMF’s Balance-of-Payments Statistics. 
b The PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guides. 




  21Appendix B. FDI Determinants with Capital Openness 
(Table 4 with the conventional binary capital openness variable) 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 


















































No. of obs 
F-Stat 























The *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are in the 
parentheses. All specifications also include the following control variables: corruption, financial risk 
index, political risk index, exports (% of GDP), GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth 
volatility, interest rate controls, lagged value of FDI net inflows, gross fixed capital formation, and 
inflation. Complete results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
  22Appendix C. FDI Determinants with Capital Openness  
(Table 4 with the Edwards Index) 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 
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F-Stat 























The *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are in the 
parentheses. All specifications also include the following control variables: corruption, financial risk 
index, political risk index, exports (% of GDP), GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth 
volatility, interest rate controls, lagged value of FDI net inflows, gross fixed capital formation, and 
inflation. Complete results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
  23Appendix D. FDI Determinants with Capital Openness and Interaction Terms 
Developing Countries 
(Table 5 with the Edwards Index) 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 


















(.0050)     .0119*** 
(.0044)    
KAFIN    -.0005 





KAPOL     .0004 
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F-Stat 







































The *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are in the 
parentheses. All specifications also include the following control variables: corruption, financial risk index, 
political risk index, exports (% of GDP), GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth volatility, interest 
rate controls, lagged value of FDI net inflows, gross fixed capital formation, and inflation. Complete results 




  24Appendix E. FDI Determinants with Capital Openness and Interaction Terms 
Developed Countries 
(Table 6 with the Edwards Index) 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 
Variable OLS  FE 














(.0059)     .0157** 
(.0071)    
KAFIN    -.0016 
(.0012)               -.0004 
(.0019)   
KAPOL     .0028*** 
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The *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are in the 
parentheses. All specifications also include the following control variables: corruption, financial risk index, 
political risk index, exports (% of GDP), GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, GDP growth volatility, interest 
rate controls, lagged value of FDI net inflows, gross fixed capital formation, and inflation. Complete results 




  25Figure 1: FDI Inflows into Emerging Markets and Developing Countries 
 
Data in billion $US. Data is from the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report, 2006. Data for 2005 is 
estimated and for 2006 is predicted (predictions taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook). 
  26Table 1. World Distribution of FDI 
  FDI net inflows 
(% of GDP) 
FDI net inflows 

















World  1.12 2.00 3.97 5.05 4.60 8.86  15.33  24.72
East  Asia  2.61  4.60  6.10 5.26 10.28 19.05 22.66 20.84
South-East  Asia  2.70  4.19  5.51 3.27 7.88 16.35 21.22 12.75
Latin  America  0.75 2.21 4.12 3.64 3.31 9.36  18.19  17.80
Africa  0.76 1.19 4.61 2.87 3.56 6.64  13.64  14.33
Middle East and 
North Africa 
0.73 1.23 0.74 1.62 2.80 5.61 3.35 7.53
Other  1.21 1.26 3.66 4.64 4.53 6.84  16.58  19.64
Data is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2004: BX.KLT.DINV.DT.GD.ZS and 
BX.KLT.DINV.DT.GI.ZS. 
  27Table 2. Macroeconomic Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Developing Countries 
Authors Sample  Capital 
Controls data 
Impact on FDI 
Aizenman and Noy (2006) 
81 countries,  
1982-1998 
AREAR  GDP per capita (+), goods trade (+), trade in incomes (+), foreign growth (+), 
corruption (-),  
Albuquerque et al. (2005) 
74 developing,  
1970-1999 
 
G3 interest rates (-), US yield curve slope (-), World growth (-), GDP growth 
(+), trade openness (+), financial depth (+), government consumption (-), GDP 
growth volatility (-) 
Asiedu and Lien (2004) 
96 developing, 
1970-2000 
AREAR  Trade openness (+), GDP per capita (-, + for square), fixed domestic investment 




  Sensitivity analysis: only GDP per capita, and GDP in PPP$ are robust. 




Gastanga et al. (1998) 
49 developing,  
1970-95 
AREAR  Controls (-), tax rate (-), tariff (-), past growth (+), future growth (+) 






Nothing significant on volume of FDI. Composition changes with capital 
controls, US interest rate and monetary policy 
Wei (2000)  Bilateral cross-section    Corruption (-), tax (-), population (+), distance (-), linguistic tie (+), wage (+) 
  28Table 3. FDI Determinants without Capital Openness 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 
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   Table 4. FDI Determinants with Capital Openness 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 


















































No. of obs 
F-Stat 























The *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are in 
parentheses. All specifications also include all the control variables included in table 3. Complete results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
  30Table 5. FDI Determinants with Capital Openness and Interaction Terms: 
Developing Countries 
 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 


















(.2867)     .8005*** 
(.3007)    
KAFIN    -.0225 





KAPOL     .0453* 
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The *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are in 
parentheses. All specifications also include all the control variables included in table 3. Complete results 




  31Table 6. FDI Determinants with Capital Openness and Interaction Terms: 
Developed Countries 
 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 
Variable OLS  FE 














(.4682)     1.894*** 
(.5273)    
KAFIN    .0013 
(.0679)     .1282 
(.1543)   
KAPOL     .1785*** 
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The *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are in 
parentheses. All specifications also include all the control variables included in table 3. Complete results 






  32Table 7. A-B GMM Estimations: FDI Determinants with Capital Openness 
Developing Countries 
 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 
















KACOR    .7509*** 
(.1155)    
KAFIN     .0893** 
(.0497)   
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The *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are in 
parentheses. All specifications also include all the control variables included in table 3. Complete results 
are available from the authors upon request. The model is estimated with the two-step Arellano-Bond 
GMM dynamic panel methodology using two lags of the FDI variable. 
  33Table 8. A-B GMM Estimations: FDI Determinants with Capital Openness 
Developed Countries 
 
Dependent Variable: FDI inflows 
















KACOR    1.930* 
(1.152)    
KAFIN     .1245 
(.1309)   
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The *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are in 
parentheses. All specifications also include all the control variables included in table 3. Complete results 
are available from the authors upon request. The model is estimated with the two-step Arellano-Bond 
GMM dynamic panel methodology using two lags of the FDI variable. 
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